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ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI (India)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS

Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. D. POPOV

Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. S. F. RAE

Mr. C. J. MARSHALL

Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

Mr. A. MIKAEL

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K. P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont.)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. R. BOMAN

Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY

Mr. V. V. SHUSTOV

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. H. KHALLAFF

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY

Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER

Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. G. BUNN

Mr. D. S. MACDONALD

Special Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the two hundred and forty-fifth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker, I should like to express, on behalf of the Indian delegation as well as on behalf of the Committee, congratulations to the Soviet delegation upon the twin triumph of the Soviet Union in landing the Venus-3 capsule on Venus and in accomplishing a close fly-past of the planet by the space probe Venus-2. Those remarkable technological achievements are all the more impressive as they come so soon after the soft landing of Luna-9 on the moon.

On behalf of the Indian delegation I extend a welcome to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and I trust that he will stay with us.

The Indian delegation also welcomes Mr. Adrian Fisher, who has rejoined us to lead the United States delegation. We look forward to continued co-operation with him and his delegation.

Mr. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic) (translation from French):

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my delegation I should like to associate myself with your congratulations to the Soviet Union on its latest space exploit. I should also like to welcome among us Mr. Protitch and Mr. Fisher.

The General Assembly, in its resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161) on non-proliferation, formally called upon our Committee to negotiate urgently an international treaty on that problem. My delegation considers that resolution to inaugurate the last stage towards reaching a final solution of the problem, after a long period of vacillation and groping that everyone is happy to see at an end.

Our Committee's composition of nuclear and non-nuclear, aligned and non-aligned countries, representing the main currents of world thought, guarantees our success. Our efforts so far have already led to a number of tangible and encouraging results; the opportunity we have today to conclude an acceptable treaty is perhaps the most propitious which has yet occurred. For that reason my delegation earnestly desires to make its modest contribution to this last stage of our negotiations.

The political will to give concrete form to the principle of non-proliferation in international life is more evident than ever among the non-nuclear countries as well as among the nuclear Powers members of this Committee. In that connexion we note the statement made to the General Assembly on 29 September 1965 by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs:

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

"France desires dissemination no more than any other country, and knows quite well that the Powers that find themselves with the redoubtable privilege of the atomic weapon will never agree to share it with others" (A/PV.1341, p.52).

Moreover, it is to our benefit this session that the broad lines determining the form and content of the action contemplated by the international community for the solution of this problem were discussed and adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/RES/2028 (XX)). In regard to the form of this action, the General Assembly decided that it should be embodied in an international treaty which would apply to all States without exception, nuclear and non-nuclear.

The United States and Soviet draft treaties (ENDC/152, 164) are both based on this premise. Thus, President Johnson, in his message to our Committee on 27 January 1966, stated with reference to a non-proliferation treaty:

(continued in English)

"We are prepared to sign such a treaty, making it applicable to nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike" (ENDC/165).

(continued in French)

Accordingly one point must be taken as definitely established: that the agreed form of international action on non-proliferation is the conclusion of a treaty embracing both groups of countries, nuclear and non-nuclear, whatever their degree of nuclear development. This approach is the only one that can adequately solve an essentially universal problem. Any provisional or piecemeal solution of the problem at this stage might be a step backwards and nullify all our previous efforts.

That being so, the question which immediately springs to mind is what sort of treaty we need. First of all, none of us is interested in signing an ineffective treaty. To draft such an instrument would be quite worthless and a waste of time. Nor can any of us expect the treaty to contain everything that he wants. However,

(Mir. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

my delegation feels sure that our debate will benefit from the confrontation of our respective viewpoints, on which can be based a common attitude acceptable to us all, and particularly to the international community at large which has given us a mandate to negotiate this treaty.

Before going on to consider a non-proliferation treaty article by article, my delegation would like to explain its conception of a non-dissemination treaty in the light of Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). To do so, an attempt must be made to answer two questions:

- (1) What function do we wish to assign to the non-proliferation treaty?
- (2) What characteristics do we wish the treaty to possess so that it may perform that function?

A non-proliferation treaty is generally understood to mean a treaty whereby the non-nuclear countries undertake to renounce nuclear weapons altogether and to deny themselves any access to such weapons. For their part the nuclear countries undertake not to disseminate nuclear weapons, and to refrain from exploiting such dissemination as an instrument of national policy, in order either to keep friends, to threaten enemies or to acquire economic, military or strategic advantages. That general understanding, though correct in principle, does not absolve us from the need to determine as clearly as possible the function of a non-proliferation treaty.

As my delegation has said from the outset, it does not consider the function of such a treaty to be merely to bless and perpetuate the nuclear monopoly and supremacy of the five Powers which possess the bomb. I think that everyone is agreed on this point. We are happy to note that the two great nuclear Powers have categorically repudiated any such idea, and for that we are grateful.

Nor do we consider that such a treaty should be limited to solving a difficult political problem concerning a particular continent, or that its sole purpose should be to procure a political or military advantage for a particular country or group of countries. It must match the nature and extent of the problem with which we are all concerned: a general problem of interest to humanity as a whole, regarding which we are all united. Consequently the problem and its solution must be carefully thought out in general and objective terms.

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

My country believes that a non-proliferation treaty must be conceived as the result of a belated but rational reaction of the entire international community to the nuclear evil which has already contaminated five Powers and threatens to spread to others. We believe it is our duty to try to express in a treaty this reaction by the international community. To do so adequately, the treaty must be capable of arresting decisively and as soon as possible the spread of the nuclear cancer to other countries, and of creating the most favourable conditions for attacking the evil itself and freeing mankind altogether from it.

This conception of the problem indicates the main features of a suitable settlement on non-proliferation, which were in fact brought out in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). The treaty must be first complete, secondly effective, thirdly definitive, fourthly viable and lasting, and fifthly clear and precise.

First of all, the treaty must stop proliferation completely. This is implicit in operative sub-paragraph 2(a) of Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which says that the treaty should be void of any crack, flaw or breach which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.

The first two articles of both the United States and the Soviet draft treaties attempt more or less successfully to comply with this condition, although the Soviet text of article I is more in line with the General Assembly provision than is its United States counterpart. When we come to discuss the drafts article by article we may have specific comments to make on these two articles; Mrs. Myrdal has already asked some pertinent questions in her speech of 24 February (ENDC/PV.243). I will, however, venture to make a few general comments on these articles here and now.

In referring to the grant or transfer of nuclear weapons and to the provision of assistance in connexion with nuclear weapons, the two articles in the United States and the Soviet drafts appear to envisage one type of action only: the deliberate, wilful and premeditated transfer of nuclear weapons, or assistance in connexion therewith, which are no doubt acts of the most flagrant and reprehensible class. But there may be another kind of loop-hole, no less dangerous, which is apparently not envisaged in the present texts: transfer or assistance resulting from omission, negligence, carelessness or even accident and increasing the risk of nuclear war.

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

My delegation considers that the present texts should be appropriately amended to take account of this type of dissemination, and to satisfy the requirement contained in the last sentence of the first principle set forth in sub-paragraph 2(a) of Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which prohibits proliferation in any form.

I should now like to draw attention to a particular aspect of article I of the United States draft treaty. That article is so worded as to leave open the possibility that an organization having independent power to use nuclear weapons may one day take the place of one of the present nuclear States. My delegation has difficulty in accepting a text which provides for that or any similar contingency. Although, according to the text, such an organization could only exist if a nuclear State renounced in favour of that organization its independent power to use nuclear weapons so that ultimately there would be no increase in the number of nuclear entities, we cannot accept such an alternative. That possibility, even though it might appear to reduce the number of nuclear entities, could in fact lead to dissemination and thus increase the risk of a nuclear confrontation.

There is perhaps a temptation, at first sight, to believe that such an organization limits and prevents dissemination; but in reality, on reflexion, we find that it raises a whole series of serious problems and difficulties which will sooner or later breach the principle of non-dissemination. That is due to the fundamental difference between the definite concept of a State and the indefinite concept of an organization.

To illustrate my point I will give an example -- one of many -- of the difficulties which might lead to dissemination of nuclear weapons. If the organization were one day dissolved, what would happen to the nuclear arsenal over which it had autonomous power? Would this not be divided among its members? And how do we know that the members of the organization would not then wish to exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty contained in the United States and Soviet texts? In short, by accepting this text we should be leaving the door open to a latent form of dissemination, a kind of future loop-hole which might perpetuate dissemination. In other words, under cover of preventing dissemination today we should really be paving the way for future dissemination by a certain category of countries and continents.

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

Moreover, such an organization, by increasing its nuclear arsenal and extending its political action and interests over a wider geographical and strategic area, would increase the risks of a nuclear confrontation. We do not need a non-dissemination treaty to achieve this result.

Furthermore, if we subscribed to a text which accepted the principle of a nuclear organization -- and we know that the African and Latin-American countries have already declared their intention of denuclearizing their respective continents -- the treaty might in fact infringe the fifth principle of paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which states that --

"(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories". (ENDC/161)

When the African and Latin-American countries adopted a policy of denuclearization of their respective continents, they had in mind a status quo and a clearly-defined nuclear equilibrium composed of five specific States. This situation would no longer hold good if we permitted the establishment of one or more nuclear organizations of which we know absolutely nothing -- neither their composition, their policy nor their ambitions.

In view of the difficulties we already have with each of the five Powers which possess the bomb at present, we cannot afford to entertain the idea of an organization with independent power to use nuclear weapons. For all these reasons, this possibility must be excluded from a non-proliferation treaty.

The second characteristic of the treaty is its effectiveness, to which we attach great importance and which is referred to mainly in sub-paragraph 2(d) of the resolution. If the treaty is not to be merely a declaration of intention, its effective application must be ensured by adequate provisions. In this connexion article III of the United States draft treaty has already made a beginning which must be reinforced. My delegation hopes that we shall be able to arrive at an acceptable formulation of this text. At the same time it believes that the safeguards offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency have been discussed and approved by the members of the Agency, which the "equivalent international safeguards" for which the United States text provides have not. For this reason we agree with the remarks made by Mrs. Myrdal on this subject at a previous meeting (ENDC/PV.243, pp.5 et seq.).

(Mr. Khellaf, United Arab Republic)

Furthermore, while the effectiveness of a treaty depends primarily on the observance of its clauses by the contracting States and their official organs, it may also depend to a large extent on the way it is observed by persons, companies, firms or other private, public or semi-public bodies engaged in nuclear activities. The activities of such persons or bodies may afford a kind of loop-hole impairing the effectiveness of the treaty. This question should be studied and the responsibilities of the contracting parties towards their nationals in this field established.

The definitive character of the treaty may easily be deduced from resolution 2028 (XX), which clearly lays down that the treaty must be void of any loop-holes and be effective, which implies that it must be definitive in calling a halt to the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It must act as a real and permanent brake on dissemination.

Moreover, its conclusion will create in the world a certain nuclear equilibrium, and until we have been able to reduce or eliminate the nuclear threat we must not make it easy to denounce the treaty, for that might upset this equilibrium in an irresponsible or arbitrary fashion. Any absolute and arbitrary freedom to withdraw from the treaty and thus to commit an act of dissemination might make it useless from the outset. A treaty which closed all the loop-holes and was even a model of effectiveness but was temporary or fragile might do more harm than good. For this reason we support the principle of the unlimited duration of the treaty contained in the United States and Soviet drafts.

Coming now to the individual right of each contracting party to withdraw from the treaty, it may be noted that the present texts confer on each contracting party a discretionary and too absolute power to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that its higher interests are jeopardized. We believe that these texts should be accompanied by reasonable restrictions. Withdrawal from the treaty should not be a matter of absolute discretionary power but should depend on non-observance of the treaty arising from its non-application or violation by a contracting party, or from the fact that a third State is supplying nuclear weapons to some other State. If the injured contracting party considers that the act of dissemination which has taken place constitutes a threat to its supreme interests, it will be entitled to withdraw from the treaty.

(Mr. Khallef, United Arab Republic)

A clause of this kind concerning denunciation would strengthen the treaty and at the same time provide a kind of incentive, not only to the contracting parties but also to third States, to respect it. In any case we believe that the procedure outlined in article VI of the United States draft concerning notification of the reasons for withdrawal to the United Nations Security Council should be maintained.

The definitive character of the treaty in such an important issue also raises the question of the degree of flexibility which should be left to the treaty to make it adaptable to future realities. In this connexion my delegation suggests combining the idea contained in the Soviet text concerning the procedure for partial and limited amendments with the idea contained in the United States text relating to revision procedure. In this way we should obtain a text which would guarantee the observance and durability of the treaty and at the same time provide a sufficient margin of flexibility. Such a treaty would ensure more effectively the continued non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

If, as we hope, we succeed in drafting here a treaty which will prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons completely, effectively and definitively, it will help to consolidate international peace and security, strengthen mutual trust among peoples, promote the cause of peaceful co-existence, prevent a fresh and useless nuclear arms race, and reduce to some extent the threat of nuclear war.

But the utmost care must be taken to ensure that the benefits thus procured are not temporary and fragile. To ensure that, the treaty must fulfil another essential requirement: it must be durable and viable. This brings us to what is perhaps the most difficult and most significant aspect of the treaty: its link with the problem of nuclear disarmament.

The most direct and deadly threat to the existence of a treaty on non-dissemination derives from the continual presence and constant improvement of huge and ever-growing stocks of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons without any hope of slowing down or halting the race. Whether we like it or not, existing nuclear weapons cast an ominous shadow over the proposed non-dissemination treaty and confront its draftsmen with a grave problem which they cannot evade.

(Mr. Khallaf, United Arab Republic)

We are all familiar with the serious divergences of view which exist between the nuclear Powers concerning the method of solving the nuclear disarmament problem in general. Nevertheless, these divergencies and difficulties have not discouraged the non-aligned and non-nuclear countries, which have expressed a general wish that a treaty on non-proliferation should be reinforced by tangible measures of nuclear disarmament. In our Committee this general feeling was first expressed in the Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned delegations on 15 September 1965 which states:

"A treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but only a means to an end. That end is the achievement of General and Complete Disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should therefore be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery." (ENDC/158)

This memorandum received warm support at the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, which incorporated two significant sub-paragraphs in its resolution 2028 (XX): sub-paragraph 2 (b), which stipulates that "The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;" and sub-paragraph 2 (c), which stipulates that the treaty "should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament".

If we compare these two sub-paragraphs, we see that the General Assembly has taken into account the underlying concern expressed in the Joint Memorandum of the eight delegations. We must now be more precise and apply the two directives given to us by the Assembly, so that the treaty on non-dissemination may be truly viable and durable. I am pleased to note that the members of our Committee have begun to submit specific proposals which can be linked to the treaty or included in it.

On 27 January the Nigerian delegation reiterated that an indispensable element in any non-proliferation measure is a firm undertaking with adequate guarantees by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear

(Mr. Khalaf, United Arab Republic)

Powers under any circumstances whatever, or to threaten to use them (ENDC/PV.235, p.31). This proposal met with a favourable response from the Soviet Union, which in Mr. Kosygin's important message to this Committee declared:

"In order to facilitate agreement on the conclusion of a treaty, the Soviet Government declares its willingness to include in the draft treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory". (ENDC/167, pp.2,3)

The United Arab Republic, which has always advocated the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, understands the prohibition referred to in Mr. Kosygin's proposal as an application in a specific case of the general rule of total prohibition of these weapons. In this sense we support the proposal.

The Nigerian delegation also repeated the statement it had made in the First Committee at the last General Assembly session: that non-proliferation measures should not be left to stand on their own for too long and that strenuous efforts should be made to attain the four additional objectives it mentioned (ENDC/PV.235, p.32).

At our meeting on 15 February Mr. Trivedi stated:

"The Indian delegation has urged on many occasions that the least that should be agreed upon, at least as a beginning, is that all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear, should forego further production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles designed to carry those weapons. A provision of this nature must necessarily be incorporated -- or, as the principle says, embodied -- in the treaty". (ENDC/PV.240, p.18)

Referring to the balance which should be established in the treaty, the Mexican representative stated in the Committee on 22 February:

"... the Mexican delegation feels obliged to point out here and now that in its view an absolutely essential condition of such a balance must be the final cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in any environment whatever." (ENDC/PV.242, p.9)

Mr. Gomez Robledo added that his delegation did not ask that this stipulation should be inserted specifically in the non-proliferation treaty, although technically there was nothing to prevent it.

(Mr. Khallef, United Arab Republic)

At our meeting on 24 February the Swedish representative, Mrs. Myrdal, said:

"The question might be pondered as to what extent an agreement on other measures which constitute 'tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race' -- such as a complete test ban, or, as perhaps is most germane to the non-proliferation issue, a cut-off of further production of nuclear weapon material -- might be related to the entry into force of a non-proliferation treaty." (ENDC/PV.243, p.10)

At our last meeting the representative of Brazil asked:

(continued in English)

"Why do not the nuclear Powers, along with the treaty, commit themselves, through a declaration of intention, to carrying out a programme based on ... four points: ...?" (ENDC/PV.244, p.17)

(continued in French)

In general, and without going into details in each case, my delegation considers that those proposals call for favourable consideration by our Committee, which should decide on the need to link them up with the treaty or to incorporate them in it. We are ready to co-operate in this Committee in such a fruitful task.

The delegation of the United Arab Republic would like to supplement these proposals with another, more general, proposal which we feel should be included in any case in a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to ensure its political and technical viability and balance. In proposing this general measure my delegation has in mind the following situation.

The non-nuclear countries will in law renounce their right to nuclear weapons, but nuclear stockpiles and the threat of a nuclear confrontation will in fact continue to exist indefinitely, even if one or all of the foregoing proposals are adopted. This de facto situation could always constitute an incitement to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. To diminish this risk still further it will be necessary, pending the complete elimination by radical measures of nuclear stockpiles and the nuclear threat, to include in the treaty a formal and definite indication of what the nuclear Powers propose to do with the existing nuclear armament. We know, unfortunately, that the total destruction and prohibition of nuclear weapons will take some time yet, and that

(Mr. Khalaf, United Arab Republic)

the partial measures proposed to support a treaty on non-proliferation would only partly meet the requirements of the situation which would ensue from the conclusion of the treaty.

My delegation therefore considers that a treaty on non-dissemination should contain a separate article under which the nuclear Powers would assume the legal obligation to halt the nuclear arms race, limit, reduce and eliminate stocks of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, and to that end continue and expedite negotiations in order to reach agreement on suitable concrete measures.

The inclusion of such a clause in the treaty, and its application in good faith, would make it possible to assess objectively the exercise of the right of withdrawal from the treaty for non-observance, as we have conceived it. Likewise it would solemnly confirm that the present factual nuclear monopoly will not become a legal one as a result of the non-dissemination treaty, as a substantial sector of world public opinion fears it will.

Lastly, we should like the treaty to possess the qualities of clarity and precision. Mrs. Myrdal (ENDC/PV.243, pp.10 et seq.) and Mr. Burns (ENDC/PV.241, pp.14 et seq.) have already referred to these qualities. We believe they are essential in a treaty of this kind in order to avoid misunderstandings and ambiguities, which are apt to create difficulties in its application or interpretation. My delegation believes, however, that the text of the proposed treaty will acquire clarity and precision as the negotiations proceed.

Before concluding I should like to refer to a question which has been raised several times in this Committee. It concerns the nuclear protection which nuclear countries contemplate extending to non-nuclear countries in the event of a nuclear threat or attack. The United Arab Republic's delegation has already had occasion at the last General Assembly session (A/C.1/PV.1359, p.33-35) to state categorically our objections of principle to such protection, which is not feasible and would assuredly increase the risks of a nuclear confrontation. In our view, observance of the United Nations Charter and the total elimination of nuclear weapons would give a valid and adequate assurance in this respect.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Before beginning my statement, I should like to welcome back Mr. Protitch and the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher. I should also like to join the Chairman and representative of the United Arab Republic in congratulating the Soviet Union on its great scientific feat in placing a space vehicle on Venus. I do not know whether it is appropriate to say that it is perhaps symbolically encouraging that the Soviet Union made its target Venus, the Goddess of Love, rather than Mars, the God of War. We hope so, in any case.

In the statement which we made on 17 February 1966, we said that it was essential that the Committee should hear the views of its non-aligned members on the principles which should guide us in the negotiation of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.241, p.10). Recently the Committee has heard valuable statements made by the representatives of India (ENDC/PV.240), Mexico (ENDC/PV.242), Ethiopia (*ibid.*), Sweden (ENDC/PV.243), Brazil (ENDC/PV.244), and today by the representative of the United Arab Republic. The representative of Nigeria spoke on the first day of the Conference (ENDC/PV.235), and at that time he indicated the Nigerian position on the matters before us. Today I should like to comment on some of the points raised by those representatives in their statements, and perhaps suggest further questions for them to consider.

Perhaps it is too late to suggest that we should stop using the ambiguous polysyllable "proliferation" and speak instead of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Since -- in my view unfortunately -- we have been using the terms "proliferation" and "non-proliferation" for a year or so, and have sanctified them in a United Nations resolution, it would be difficult to abandon them now. However, we should at least agree together on what we mean by the words. Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, has asked for a definition (ENDC/PV.243, p.10). Mr. Foster, the representative of the United States, has told us what the United States understands the word to mean as it is used in disarmament negotiations (ENDC/PV.241, pp.34,35). The representative of India has argued (ENDC/PV.240, pp.16,17) that the term "proliferation" should apply also to the increasing of stockpiles of nuclear weapons by nations which now possess them; and, taking the simple dictionary meaning of the word, I believe that argument has some justification.

But the Canadian delegation believes that ever since the problem of non-dissemination — as it was called at first — began to be discussed, it has been recognized as being to prevent the appearance of new nations or other entities with the

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

independent right and ability to dispose of nuclear weapons. We believe also that along with the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty there should be parallel negotiations on collateral measures. Several non-aligned representatives have stated that a commitment to seek early agreement on such measures is the minimum required of the nuclear Powers to demonstrate that they really intend a treaty on non-proliferation as a first step in the disarmament process and not as an end in itself.

The third of the nine questions which the representative of Sweden put to the Committee on 24 February was "why a non-proliferation treaty should endeavour to cancel the nuclear option just for States which at present are non-nuclear". (ENDC/PV.243, p.7). Mrs. Myrdal also referred to a question put by the representative of India:

"Why is it that a third country has chosen to be a nuclear weapon Power?

Why is it that a fourth country is developing nuclear weapons and missiles?

And why is it that a fifth country is embarking on a nuclear weapon programme?".

(ENDC/PV.240, p.14)

I do not know whether Mr. Trivedi considered that the first and second nations to manufacture nuclear weapons were perfectly justified in doing so; but he enquired only about the third, fourth and fifth. Mrs. Myrdal then said: "If there exist valid arguments for these States to possess nuclear weapons, why do they not apply to any other countries?" (ENDC/PV.243, p.8). Brief answers to those questions might, I think, help us.

As for the United States, the first nation to explode a nuclear weapon, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said on 23 February last to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy:

"... the United States believed that even one nuclear Power was too many, and immediately after World War II we sought to remove nuclear energy from the military field. It is a great tragedy that our proposals were not accepted then." (Daily Radio Bulletin No 46, 24 February 1966, p.1)

The representative of the Soviet Union can, if he sees fit, answer the question as it applies to his country. At our last meeting we had a rejoinder from the representative of the United Kingdom as to his country's position. (ENDC/PV.244). As for France, President de Gaulle gave the answer in his press conference on 22 February this year; and representatives may study the reasons he gave then and also the more extended version of them which he gave in his famous press Conference of February 1963. The People's Republic of China gave its reasons for becoming the

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

fifth country to explode a nuclear bomb in a statement of 16 October 1964 contained in a letter which was sent to very many countries -- including I am sure, all those represented here. That document can be consulted in order to learn the Chinese reasons.

States which do not possess nuclear weapons but have the capacity to manufacture them can assess for themselves the validity of the reasons given by all the nuclear Powers for having produced nuclear weapons, and can decide whether those apply in their case and whether they constitute adequate grounds for embarking on the expensive process of becoming a nuclear military Power. I mention expense, and that is a point of vital importance. To produce a really effective nuclear deterrent force is extremely costly. Here I should like to quote from a short article appearing in the London Economist:

"The only deterrent to a country set on possessing nuclear weapons is an economic one. Fortunately, it is still effective. What matters is not whether a country can or cannot make nuclear weapons; but whether it could or could not fight a nuclear war ... All a country needs to produce a few warheads' worth of plutonium is some uranium plus a certain type of nuclear reactor. This does not have to be as big as an atomic power station. It could merely be one of the bigger types of research reactor, the sort Britain sells for £5 million. Given reasonable secrecy, a country could run such a research reactor to provide material for one or two bombs a year without the world being any the wiser. £15 million could cover the lot ...

"All-plutonium bombs are inferior to bombs based on uranium 235. As the switch continues from small atomic bombs to big H-bombs, a country with serious claims to be a nuclear power must have uranium 235. This is where economic factors start to pinch. Plants for extracting uranium 235 (chemically indistinguishable from ordinary uranium) throw a big strain on the engineering industry; cost fantastic sums; and require vast amounts of electricity, which strains the power network. What takes the effort is boosting the concentration of uranium 235 from its normal under 1 per cent of the total to close on 100 per cent".

The article then states that the centrifuging process being experimented with in certain countries is thought to be uneconomic for producing large quantities of uranium 235, and it goes on:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"But for small quantities required to trigger a few bombs, it would be substantially cheaper - in capital cost at least. It might bring modern nuclear weapons (as distinct from unsatisfactory purely plutonium ones) within the reach of small countries ..."

"France's effort is probably the least to qualify a country as a serious nuclear Power. This provides capacity for between ten and twenty bombs a year - half Britain's at its production peak ... French military atomic expenditure is running at £250 million a year; this does not include work in hand on ballistic missiles to carry the bombs. All available figures suggest anything much below a capital outlay of £1,000 million" -- that is, approximately \$2,800 million -- "is unlikely to be very effective." (The Economist, 15 January 1966, pp.213,214)

The Economist finishes its article by asking how many countries could and would spend that much; and its reply is: probably in Europe only Sweden, and outside Europe only China. The Economist also suggests that India and Israel both have reasons for wanting to join the nuclear club, but, of necessity, on a smaller scale.

At this point we might offer some observations on the question whether it would be worthwhile for a country which does not possess nuclear weapons to create a minor "nuclear capability" of a score or so of multi-kiloton bombs, with missiles to deliver them at medium ranges -- and to spend about \$800 million in doing so. If a major nuclear Power were the adversary, such a force -- a minor nuclear force -- would merely free the nuclear Power from any scruples of conscience about using nuclear might against a nation with no nuclear armament, and would certainly attract vast nuclear destruction. Of what use would such a force be against a hostile neighbour, a military Power in the second rank? It could be expected that the neighbour would also build up such a force. There would be no gain in the balance of security, merely the waste of a great deal of money which could be employed for much better purposes. The mutual security of such hypothetical hostile neighbours could be much better attained by a non-proliferation agreement which had effective guarantees.

We turn now to what Mr. Gomez Robledo, the representative of Mexico, stated so clearly and forcefully on the necessity of preventing the increase of independent nuclear Powers:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"... it is of the greatest urgency ... for us to conclude rapidly, if possible at the current session, the non-proliferation treaty .. so that ... the present balance of terror will not be replaced by an imbalance and by the unrestrained irruption of terror into all aspects of our daily life. Yet either that or the final catastrophe is what will happen if tomorrow the number of members of the dreaded 'atomic club' rises from five to ten, and perhaps a great many more." (ENDC/PV.242, p.12)

Mr. Gomez Robledo here states in classical form the reason why it is essential that we conclude a treaty on non-proliferation.

We are glad to be able to agree, as Lord Chalfont told us the United Kingdom agrees (ENDC/PV.244, p.5) with the view of the Indian delegation (ENDC/PV.240, p.14) that no prestige should accrue to nations which embark on nuclear weapon programmes, and that there must be an end to the provocative idea of a select club which could meet together and presume to take the decision whether the world is to be saved or destroyed.

Now we turn to operative sub-paragraph 2(b) of resolution 2028 (XX), which may be variously interpreted by different nations which voted for the resolution. That paragraph says:

"The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers." (ENDC/161)

Here the question is, what is "acceptable"? On 15 February the representative of India set forth (ENDC/PV.240, p.17) his view regarding what the non-nuclear non-aligned countries want as an acceptable balance in a non-proliferation treaty. In the same statement he observed:

"The principle, as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, forbids not only non-nuclear Powers but also nuclear Powers to proliferate. It says so specifically and categorically. It does not say that the non-nuclear Powers shall not proliferate but the nuclear Powers may proliferate ... This is a very important aspect of the first principle stipulated by the United Nations and must be reflected in any draft which merits serious consideration." (*ibid.*, pp. 16 and 17)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The representative of India then stated (*ibid.*, p.18) -- and the representative of the United Arab Republic has already referred to this -- that the least that should be agreed upon is that all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear, should forgo further production of nuclear weapons. In reply to that the United States delegation stated on 17 February (ENDC/PV.241, pp.36 *et seq.*) its views on the impracticability at the present time of incorporating such a provision in the treaty. We have also heard a similar view from the representative of Czechoslovakia (ENDC/PV.236, p.15) and of Bulgaria (ENDC/PV.243, p.18); and this view is presumably held by all the Warsaw Pact Powers, including the Soviet Union.

The Canadian delegation would be very happy to see agreements made to stop the further production of nuclear weapons and vehicles for them. We have drawn attention many times to the proposals of the United States (ENDC/120) which, if accepted, would have this effect; but it is well known that up to the present the Soviet Union has not seen its way clear to accept such proposals even in principle.

The representative of Brazil said at our meeting on 1 March:

"... in view of the dramatic urgency of our task, it would not be possible to establish an immediate link between the signature of the treaty and the implementation of a programme of related measures." (ENDC/PV.244, p.16)

Mr. Correa do Lago also made the suggestion, which the Canadian delegation thinks should be carefully considered by the nuclear Powers, that those Powers should commit themselves through a declaration of intention to take "tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery", and also to stop all nuclear weapon tests (*ibid.*, p.17).

This would be a variation of the suggestion which we have heard from the representative of the United Arab Republic today -- if I understood it correctly -- that a similar declaration should be incorporated in the treaty. Mr. Gomez Robledo told us (ENDC/PV.242, p.9) that the view of his country, Mexico, is that an absolutely essential condition of the so-called balance of responsibilities must be the final cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments; that is, the completion of the Moscow test-ban Treaty (ENDC/10G/Rev.1) to include the underground environment. The representative of Ethiopia took the same stand, for he said: "Perhaps that is the first step that could be taken by the Powers to prove the sincerity of their declaration on nuclear disarmament." (ENDC/PV.242, p.23). Other

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

non-aligned nations have also suggested abolishing underground testing as a balance to the agreement by nations which do not possess nuclear weapons to refrain from acquiring them.

The sixth question which the representative of Sweden asked on 24 February (ENDC/PV.243, pp.9,10) was how the self-denial of nuclear "have-nots" is to be compensated by the nuclear "haves"; she suggested that a comprehensive test ban and cut-off of production of fissionable material might be negotiated in this Committee in parallel with negotiations on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Canadian delegation agrees with this viewpoint. However, we hope that the Swedish delegation would not insist that a non-proliferation treaty should not enter into force before the "tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race", which Mrs. Myrdal has mentioned, were agreed upon.

Referring to resolution 2032 (XX) (ENDC/161), regarding a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the representative of India paid tribute to the Swedish proposal for international seismic co-operation, and then said:

"India would like to see all countries agreeing to suspend all nuclear weapon tests. We can then consider what steps the international scientific community can take in mutual co-operation ...". (ENDC/PV.240, p.9)

We believe that, in saying that, the representative of India did not mean that the suspension of nuclear weapon tests must precede any steps being taken by the international scientific community to develop criteria or systems which might lead to the adequate verification of a treaty to prohibit all nuclear weapon tests.

Mrs. Myrdal's eighth question at our 243rd meeting was, what is meant by guarantees? In this connexion I would also quote what the representative of Mexico said on 22 February. He asked (ENDC/PV.242, p.6) how the non-possessing nations were to be assured that they would not be the victims of nuclear attack. He said that the question of balance presupposes so-called guarantees to be given to the non-possessing nations, if they agree not to make nuclear weapons. He went on (*ibid.*, p.7) to discuss the proposal put forward by Mr. Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (ENDC/167), and said that, as Mexico interpreted the proposal of the Soviet Union, it would respect denuclearized zones which might be established. He then quoted the message from President Johnson: "The nations that do not seek the nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail." (ENDC/165, p.2) He said that, if

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

President Johnson's offer should prove to be merely a unilateral declaration, he did not see how it could be discussed in a negotiating body such as ours. If, on the other hand, it were to be proposed as a new article in the treaty -- that is, an undertaking that all nuclear Powers would respect -- then the Mexican delegation would be able to express its views upon it.

It is the belief of the Canadian delegation that we should have detailed discussions on this question of guarantees. What, as Mrs. Myrdal asked, is meant by a "guarantee"? If we take the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary, the verb "to guarantee" means "to answer for the fulfilment of a contract; to engage that something has happened or will happen; to secure against, or from, risk". It is this last interpretation which we have in mind, I suppose, when we used the word "guarantee" here.

In general, when one nation undertakes to secure another from military risks, this takes the form of a treaty in which there are very specific provisions. If the treaty contains provisions that one party is to secure another against attack of any kind, it amounts to an alliance and in general there are obligations laid on both parties. In the case we are considering, presumably the obligation on a non-possessing State is no more than not to acquire or make nuclear weapons. The other party, the nuclear State, would have to assume more specifically defined obligations. There would have to be set out what precisely the conditions would be under which assistance would be rendered, and also precisely what action the guarantor would take to protect the guaranteed against risk.

Considering this, the Canadian delegation comes to the conclusion that it would be very difficult to incorporate effective guarantees in a simple treaty on non-proliferation, a treaty resembling the United States and USSR drafts. Of course, it is possible that the nuclear Powers here represented, or one of them, could produce the text of an article setting out in general terms the principle that nuclear Powers were responsible for ensuring against nuclear attack or threats of it the safety of non-aligned nations which agreed to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Such an article could serve as a basis for separate bilateral or multi-lateral agreements to be made between those non-nuclear nations which felt that they needed guarantees and one or more of the nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

On the other hand, the proposal that the Soviet Union has put forward, that nuclear Powers should not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear nation, could presumably be inserted in the treaty as a fairly simple article; and, as we have heard, the representative of Mexico has asked the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.242, p.8) to produce a draft for such an article. The non-possessing nations could then consider whether such a pledge would be an adequate protection for them.

Mrs. Myrdal's fourth question was whether there are not really four categories of "nuclearity" -- if I may use that expression. She wondered whether one treaty could be made to deal with the situation of nations in all four of her categories (ENDC/PV.243, p.8). The Canadian delegation does not understand in what way it would be advantageous, or how it would simplify our task of negotiating a treaty, to think in terms of four categories of nations based on differing potentialities with regard to nuclear weapons. We do not see why it is impossible to produce a treaty based on the idea that there are certain nuclear "haves", and that it is undesirable for present nuclear "have-nots" to join the "haves". This viewpoint was clearly expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom at our meeting of 1 March (ENDC/PV.244, pp.5 et seq.).

Again, I quote from the statement of the representative of India: "There cannot be three categories of nations: nuclear nations, non-nuclear nations in alliance with nuclear nations, and non-nuclear non-aligned nations." (ENDC/PV.240, p.16) We know that there are nations possessing nuclear arms, five of them; there are non-aligned nations not possessing nuclear arms, eight of which are represented here; and there are nations not possessing nuclear arms which are allied with nuclear Powers -- six such nations, including Canada, are in fact represented here, and there are many others not represented in this Committee. I wonder whether what the representative of India meant to convey was that it cannot be agreed that any of the non-possessing nations allied to possessing nations should be allowed, under the terms of the treaty we are to negotiate, any greater opportunity of becoming a "nuclear State" or "nation possessing nuclear weapons" than the non-aligned non-nuclear nations. If that was the meaning, I could agree with such a principle.

Finally, in her ninth question the representative of Sweden asked whether there should be a time limit on the treaty (ENDC/PV.243, pp.13 et seq.). The representative of Brazil said on 1 March:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"Moreover, we should consider the desirability of limiting the duration of the treaty in order to permit its revision in the light of the results of its application and the progress achieved in the implementation of the related programme." (ENDC/PV.244, p.18)

Mrs. Myrdal asked whether, as an alternative to a time limit, it is essential that the "tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race" materialize simultaneously with the treaty on non-proliferation". (ENDC/PV.243, p.14)

We hope, as I said before, that the Swedish delegation does not take the position that there should be no ratification of a treaty which might be developed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons unless these other measures "materialize simultaneously". Another possibility has been suggested: that certain States in ratifying the treaty could make a reservation stating that they would reconsider their position after a certain number of years if certain collateral measures to halt the arms race and reduce stocks of nuclear weapons were not put into effect in the meantime. We have also heard today some views from the representative of the United Arab Republic on this question of the duration of the treaty and the conditions under which any nation might seek to abrogate it; but I will refrain from commenting on them until I have had an opportunity of studying the verbatim record.

The Canadian delegation believes that the statements made by the delegations of non-aligned States here, on which I have commented, have been very useful as a beginning to the process of clarifying concepts and positions. This process is plainly necessary if we are to arrive at the text of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons which will gain general acceptance. We have tried to carry this process a stage further today by our comments and questions. I hope that when we resume in approximately two weeks' time our consideration of the non-proliferation problem, the Committee will as a result of the statements which have been made -- including of course those made today -- hear further positions on the points which have been raised, expressed by representatives of the nuclear Powers as well as of the non-aligned nations.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): At the outset, I should like to acknowledge the greetings extended by you, Mr. Chairman, and by the representatives of

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

the United Arab Republic and Canada. I should also like to join you and other representatives in congratulating the Soviet Union on its most recent advances in the exploration of space.

I should like to make a few remarks on the discussions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which have been taking place during this session of the Conference.

First, as I consider the statements made so far during this session, I observe an unstated premise which seems to be assumed by some representatives: that is, that a non-proliferation treaty is advantageous to nuclear weapon States and disadvantageous to non-nuclear weapon States. In asking themselves the inevitable and quite proper question "What does a non-proliferation treaty do for the security of my country?", some representatives of the non-nuclear weapon States seem to have found very little that is positive in the answer. I suggest that today we should explore this matter somewhat further.

As Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, has already pointed out, when my country was the only nuclear Power in the world we felt that even one nuclear Power -- although that Power was our own country -- was too many. Immediately after the Second World War we sought to remove nuclear energy entirely from the military field. We did this, not for altruistic reasons, but because we thought it in our own best interests to do so, as well as in the interests of world peace. Had our proposals been accepted, there would not be even one nuclear weapon State today.

Why did we consider that forswearing nuclear weapons would be in our interest if our potential adversaries did the same under a system of effective controls? Because, as is true at the present time for any non-nuclear weapon State, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by rival Powers would increase the danger of a nuclear exchange in which we should be involved. Today, it is true, a new nuclear weapon Power would not be likely to become a threat to the United States for a very long time. However, the same cannot be said of the potential adversaries of that new nuclear Power.

What Secretary Rusk said last week of United States interests in a non-proliferation treaty is perhaps even more true of the interests of non-nuclear weapon States. The following is a portion of his testimony before our Legislature:

"Nuclear proliferation could add a new and dangerous dimension to historical ethnic and territorial disputes existing between nations. A decision by one party to acquire nuclear weapons could generate pressures on others to 'go nuclear' -- or to destroy the nuclear facilities of the acquiring State before the programme reaches completion."

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

In other words, it stimulates the threat of preventive war.

"Nuclear weapons in the hands of more countries could have consequences for world security which no one can foresee. Every additional country having nuclear weapons, no matter how responsibly governed, is an additional center of independent decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons. International relations are thereby made more complex and more dangerous. And the risk that one of such centers could fall into irresponsible hands is increased."

Further on, Secretary Rusk stated:

"Efforts of the present nuclear Powers to negotiate mutually advantageous nuclear arms control agreements will be more complex and hence more difficult as the number of such Powers increases.

"And, of course, the overall chance of an accident or unauthorized use would increase as more nations acquired nuclear weapons."

(Daily Radio Bulletin, No.46, 24 February 1966, p.1)

Those are the reasons why we seek a non-proliferation treaty; they apply with even greater force to non-nuclear weapon countries. Those reasons have led us to conclude that we could not support what has been referred to here as a simple non-dissemination treaty. As we understand it, such a treaty would prohibit merely the transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons, or assistance in their manufacture, but would not prohibit any country not now a manufacturer of nuclear weapons from becoming one.

My delegation agrees with the statement of the representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo (ENDC/PV.242, pp.9,10), that this kind of agreement would not affect the gravest danger now before us. That danger results because the secret of the atom is no longer the monopoly of one country, or even of just a few countries. Nation after nation is acquiring plutonium and nuclear "know-how" through the construction and operation of power-producing reactors. Many have the knowledge and can quickly achieve the capability to produce a few crude bombs if they choose to do so. This they can do without receiving nuclear weapons or any assistance in their manufacture from other States.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The representative of the Soviet Union referred to an estimate that there are thirteen States which are now in the position to begin acquiring nuclear weapon capability. He said: "It cannot be doubted that such a turn of events will bring about further tension and arouse concern throughout the world." (ENDC/PV.241, p.22). For these reasons my delegation agrees with the representative of Mexico that the gravest danger is not that nuclear weapon States will give the bomb to non-nuclear weapon States but that "the various States already possessing the necessary resources may sooner or later join the 'atomic club' through their own efforts." (ENDC/PV.242, p.10)

While we do not believe that what has been referred to as a simple non-dissemination treaty would reduce the gravest danger before us, we do believe that, in addition to the complete non-proliferation treaty which we hope to negotiate, there are other measures which would achieve our non-proliferation goal. In her very thoughtful statement on 24 February the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, asked (ENDC/PV.243, p.10) whether we could not find a way to negotiate such other related collateral measures at the same time as we negotiate a non-proliferation treaty.

The recommendation of the co-Chairmen adopted at the last meeting of the Committee (ENDC/PV.244, p.4), that we take time next week to discuss other collateral measures, is the best answer I can give to Mrs. Myrdal's question. We hope that this will move us forward toward agreement on these measures. As we have said here before, however, we would not link the entry into force of one measure with that of another for fear that we might not get either. But our draft treaty, as Mrs. Myrdal rightly pointed out in discussing a later question (ENDC/PV.243, p.14), contains a review provision which is designed to permit non-nuclear weapon States to consider, after a limited period from the entry into force of the non-proliferation treaty, whether they are satisfied with the progress then made in halting the arms race.

This review provision should be viewed in the light of the preambular reference to our common objective in the United States draft: "to achieve effective agreements

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals." (ENDC/152, p.1) If such a clause appeared in the finally-agreed text, the treaty would contain an important part of what the representative of Brazil suggested should appear in a declaration of intention by the nuclear-weapon Powers (ENDC/PV.244, p.17).

Given the urgency of our task we should, of course, promptly correct any misunderstanding of the position of our Governments in pursuing it. One such misinterpretation underlies the attacks upon the United States draft treaty on the ground that it deals only with the problem of national control of nuclear weapons. In fact the United States draft treaty deals directly with the problem of international organizations or associations having independent power to use nuclear weapons. It contains an undertaking by nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike "not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons." (ENDC/152, p.1)

There are now no multilateral organizations having such independent power. We all know the present number of States which have it. The language I have quoted would ensure that the total number of organizations and States having this power did not increase beyond this number. To put it another way, the number of nuclear-weapon Powers -- whether national or international -- would never become greater than this number so long as the treaty was observed and enforced. This is what we mean when we say that there would be no increase -- even by one -- in the centres of nuclear-weapon power. The United States draft thus deals quite effectively with the problem of organizations, associations or groups of States.

Before proceeding to my next point, I should like to note here that in his extremely interesting speech this morning the representative of the United Arab Republic raised the question whether the United States draft treaty was inconsistent with the position which has been taken in the past in regard to nuclear-free zones. The United States position on nuclear-free zones has been stated many times; nothing in our position on non-proliferation in any way derogates from it. Indeed our positions on both are directed to the same end: to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to individual countries.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

As the interval shortens before yet another nation may conduct a nuclear test, the time remaining for serious negotiations should not be wasted with incessant attacks upon the legitimate right of nations to prepare for their collective defence. Yet I must say, with the greatest respect for him personally, that we heard another such attack by the representative of Poland at our last meeting. He said that "The truth is that the overwhelming majority of the Western Europeans feel no sense of insecurity, because they know very well that nobody is threatening them." (ENDC/PV.244, p.22) He also said that "The sole exception is West Germany." (ibid.)

In considering whether there is any threat to Western Europe, I think that we should bear in mind the recent article by Soviet Marshal Malinovsky which appeared in the Bulgarian publication Narodna Armiya of 22 February of this year. This article makes it quite clear that Soviet missiles continue to be aimed at territories bordering those of the Warsaw Pact countries. Reading Marshal Malinovsky's language, Western Europeans can hardly be reassured that no one is threatening them.

The representative of Poland has also suggested that the Federal Republic is the only Western European country which feels threatened. I have no right to speak here in the name of Western European governments. But, again with all respect for him personally, neither has the Polish representative. I should like to point out to him that the Federal Republic is not the only Western European member of NATO. Nor is it alone in wishing to participate in arrangements for collective defence against nuclear attack from the East. Indeed, there are now ten NATO countries participating in the meetings of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers.

What that committee and the working groups functioning under it are considering is the way in which the defence of the NATO alliance can be assured. That committee

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

is not considering any arrangements by which the United States would relinquish its control over its nuclear weapons. That committee is not considering any plan under which any non-nuclear weapon State would acquire its own capability of firing nuclear weapons.

In his interesting speech at our last meeting the representative of Poland also indicated the exact nature of the attack on NATO nuclear arrangements. There he criticised the United States draft treaty as permitting NATO collective defence arrangements which, he said, might "increase the influence of a State among its allies" (ENDC/PV.244, p.20). He made this attack even though he characterized these arrangements as arrangements which would not result in the acquisition of any independent ability to fire nuclear weapons.

I submit here that we are going far afield from the purposes of negotiating a non-proliferation agreement. Of course, the relations between States have their ups and downs. I am sure that this is true among Warsaw Pact members as well as among NATO members. But the relative influence of States within an alliance structure, whether it be the NATO structure or the structure of the Warsaw Pact, is not the legitimate concern of our deliberations here so long as it does not result in proliferation.

I do not know if the aim of the representative of Poland is the destruction of the good relations which now exist among NATO members, although I would hope that he would realize that the real interests of his country would not be advanced by any such policy. But, in any event, influence among members of either of the alliances has nothing to do with proliferation and cannot be governed by a treaty. It is wholly extraneous to the problem before this Committee.

Finally, I should like to refer to a remark made by the representative of the Soviet Union. At our first meeting at this session (ENDC/PV.235, p.19) he pointed out that frank words must be spoken if we are to clear the way to agreement. I agree with that. It is not helpful to the work of this Conference

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

if we talk about the problems facing us in one way when we are around this table and in another way in discussions at home, with our home Governments. It is in this spirit of candour, and for the purpose of giving this Conference an understanding of what the United States really thinks about the problems of reaching a non-proliferation agreement, that I should like to quote again from the testimony of the United States Secretary of State given last week before a Committee of our Legislature. Secretary Rusk testified:

"... there is no conflict between United States non-proliferation policy and possible nuclear arrangements ... for the NATO Alliance ... No one in NATO has been talking about any arrangement which would involve the proliferation of nuclear weapons. No NATO nuclear sharing proposal would increase the number of independent nuclear weapon entities".

Secretary of State Rusk went on to say:

"Certainly the Soviet Union has made charges to the contrary. They object to the very existence of NATO. They object to any arrangements which tie the United States and Western Europe more closely together for defense purposes. They object to the Federal Republic of Germany participating in the alliance on a basis of equality and partnership with other European members of the Western community. Their main propaganda drive has been directed against the Federal Republic in an effort to divide and weaken the NATO alliance. And their action in targeting hundreds of Soviet missiles on Western Europe is what created a nuclear problem in the alliance in the first place. The West German Government also is clearly on record as being opposed to acquiring a national nuclear weapons capability."

The Secretary of State concluded this portion of his testimony as follows:

"... if the Soviet Union is really interested in preventing nuclear spread -- and not just in political objectives they appear to be pursuing under the guise of non-proliferation -- it ought to be possible to move promptly towards agreement. But we should not and we cannot be placed in a position of surrendering legitimate NATO interests which are wholly consistent with the objective of non-proliferation." (Daily Radio Bulletin, No.46, 24 February 1966,
p.2)

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, permit me to express the sincere gratitude of the Soviet delegation to you as Chairman and as the representative of India, as well as to all the members of the Committee on whose behalf you congratulated us on the great new scientific and technological achievement of the Soviet Union consisting in the delivery of the pennant of the Soviet Union by the Soviet space vehicle Venus-3 to the planet Venus, over 100 million kilometres away from Earth, and in the passing of another Soviet space vehicle, the Venus-2, close by the planet Venus. I also thank Mr. Khallaf, the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, and Mr. Fisher, the representative of the United States, for their congratulations.

I should like to associate myself, Mr. Chairman, with your words of welcome to Mr. Protitch, who has come here as Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to Mr. Adrian Fisher, the representative of the United States of America, who is well known to us through his earlier participation in the work of the Committee.

At the last four meetings of our Committee, including, of course, today's meeting, a serious and, in our opinion, a most useful discussion has developed on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Many of the speakers who took the floor have expressed a number of important considerations which, although they were still mainly of a general nature and did not always directly relate to the article-by-article examination of a non-proliferation treaty, nevertheless bore witness to the profound concern of the participants in the negotiations for as rapid a solution as possible of the problem of non-proliferation.

If we sum up all these statements, I think we can conclude that the prevailing view in the Committee is that an agreement on non-proliferation is a timely and important step contributing towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In particular, this idea was clearly expressed in the statement made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo (ENDC/PV.242), who stressed that his delegation is in favour of solving the problem of non-proliferation without delay. In this connexion I should also like to recall the statement made by the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Aberra, who, in pointing out the importance of solving a whole series of problems which, like the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, would help to diminish the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

nuclear threat, at the same time remarked that "In the opinion of the Ethiopian delegation, this does not in itself diminish the magnitude of the non-proliferation problem, nor does it lessen the urgency of concluding a non-proliferation agreement." (ibid., p.19)

We listened with great attention to the statement made today by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf. This is an important statement, which sets out in great detail the attitude of the United Arab Republic towards a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We shall, of course, study most carefully all the details of this statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic. However, we should like straightway to note with satisfaction that part of Mr. Khallaf's statement in which he speaks of the need to stop the spread of the nuclear cancer and to rid humanity of the nuclear evil as quickly as possible. We also note with satisfaction that the United Arab Republic approves the proposals contained in the message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, concerning an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States which have no nuclear weapons in their territory (ENDC/167, pp. 2, 3).

Likewise of great importance for ascertaining the position of the non-aligned countries is Mr. Khallaf's statement that the United Arab Republic sees the guarantee of its security, not in being protected by someone else's nuclear umbrella, but in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. All these ideas expressed by Mr. Khallaf reflect the striving of the United Arab Republic, one of the most active and influential of the non-aligned countries, to bring about nuclear disarmament as soon as possible. This demand for nuclear disarmament is becoming more and more insistent and urgent, and is meeting with ever stronger support throughout the world; this is a positive factor in modern international life which will undoubtedly promote the concentration of efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament, that most important problem of the present day.

So far as we can judge from the statements made by some representatives of the non-aligned States in the Committee, they express definite concern about the place that a non-proliferation agreement should occupy in the general range of nuclear disarmament questions and the relationship it should have with other measures helping towards nuclear disarmament. The Soviet delegation is particularly gratified to note that an overwhelming majority of the Committee, including the delegations of the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

non-aligned countries, has decisively confirmed the need to take urgent measures that would lead to the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and to nuclear disarmament. In this respect we may note with complete justification that our views and those of the non-aligned States are identical. We are glad this is so.

In this connexion the Soviet delegation would like to stress once again that the Soviet Union does not regard the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an end in itself or as a means of preserving for the existing nuclear Powers their monopoly of nuclear weapons, but as a first step in the range of measures leading to nuclear disarmament. The implementation of such a measure as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would undoubtedly facilitate the achievement of agreement on other questions within this range. We refer above all to the solution of such questions as the establishment of denuclearized zones, the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of all nuclear tests, and so forth. For this reason we think that it would hardly be conducive to our purpose to tie up a series of measures in a single package or to make agreement on any one of these measures dependent on the implementation of other measures. In our opinion this would complicate negotiations which are difficult enough already.

During the debate many representatives of non-aligned States, while expressing a positive attitude in regard to an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, at the same time raised the question of ensuring their national security. In this connexion reference was made on several occasions to the proposal contained in the message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, to this Committee, that under a non-proliferation treaty the nuclear Powers should assume an obligation not to use nuclear weapons against States which have no such weapons in their territory. We again note with satisfaction that this proposal has met with a positive response from many delegations of non-aligned countries; in particular we might mention the statements made by the representatives of Mexico (ENDC/PV.242, p.7), Nigeria (ENDC/PV.237, p.34) and other countries.

Some representatives of non-aligned States, in particular the representatives of Sweden (ENDC/PV.243, pp.5,6) and Brazil (ENDC/PV.244, p.18), raised the point that it might perhaps be appropriate, for the fulfilment by non-nuclear States of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to take advantage of the control

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

arrangements (safeguards) worked out by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this respect we should like to announce that the Soviet Union would be prepared to examine this problem. In our opinion, however, at this stage of the discussion which has developed in the Committee it would be more appropriate to concentrate on solving the main problems: namely, on defining the range of obligations that would be assumed by the parties to the future treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we could agree in the near future on these main questions of principle, then, in our opinion, it would not be particularly difficult to settle all the other problems.

The Soviet delegation has studied carefully the statements made by representatives of the Western Powers, the United States of America, Canada and the United Kingdom. Frankly, we did not find in their speeches any new elements that would bear witness to the desire of the Western Powers to take into account the criticisms of the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152) which have been expressed both here and in the General Assembly of the United Nations by the delegations of many countries. In the statements of the Western representatives the idea was quite clearly expressed that we should begin the whole discussion in the Committee by defining the terms "non-proliferation", "access" to nuclear weapons, and so on. We do not think, however, that such a method of discussing the present question will accelerate progress. On the other hand, no one can fail to see that the articles of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164) are clearly and definitely worded and give no grounds for any ambiguous interpretation and even less for misunderstanding.

In this connexion, I should like to recall the words used by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Cernik, on 22 February, when he stated that "In our view, the demand for the prior definition of certain general concepts would in fact mean returning to the general debate". (ENDC/PV.242, p.38). Mr. Cernik went on to say:

"We are convinced that such a concrete discussion is the most appropriate basis for further clarification of the point of view of individual States and for the achievement of progress in our negotiations". (ibid.)

The Soviet delegation fully agrees with this opinion of the representative of Czechoslovakia.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

At our last meeting the representative of Poland, Mr. Blusztajn, showed very convincingly (ENDC/PV.244, p.21) that the question is not one of terms, definitions or words; and that the meaning of the word "access" which we use is not so incomprehensible to the Western representatives as Mr. Burns, for instance, tried to make out. The gist of the matter is that the Western Powers intend to give "access" to nuclear weapons to their ally, West Germany, through joint ownership and control of these weapons within the framework of the NATO military alliance. Having set themselves this objective, the Western Powers have included in their draft treaty on non-proliferation such formulas as would not prevent them from creating multilateral or other joint NATO nuclear forces. Much has been said on this subject by the representatives of the Western Powers, mainly by Mr. Foster and Lord Chalfont.

The statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster (ENDC/PV.241), has shown once again that the United States has in fact stopped half-way and does not wish to take the decisive step in order to cover completely the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In his statement Mr. Foster again spoke only about the prohibition of relinquishing nuclear weapons to the "national control" of non-nuclear States, and did not make a single move that would have made it possible to work out a treaty which would close not only direct but any indirect ways of access to nuclear weapons, for instance, through military alliances, in the form of participation in mixed multilateral nuclear forces. As the United States representative explained, the draft treaty submitted by the United States is aimed at prohibiting the independent right of non-nuclear States to use nuclear weapons.

These measures must, of course, be carried out — no one questions that —; and we have already pointed out that the United States draft does in fact provide for the closing of certain channels for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we have also said, and we repeat this again, that the United States proposal leaves open the possibility for the indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons by giving access to them to non-nuclear States and, in particular, such a State as West Germany, within the framework of the NATO military alliance.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It is essential to go further than is proposed by Mr. Foster and to ensure that no loop-holes will in fact remain for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In his statement on 17 February, Mr. Foster declared that:

"... none of the defence arrangements in existence or under discussion among NATO members would involve relinquishing nuclear weapons to the national control of any non-nuclear-weapon nation, now or at any time in the future ... Nor would any such arrangements assist any such nation in the manufacture of nuclear weapons". (ibid., p.36)

That is the limit of the United States approach to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet delegation insists that measures should be taken which would equally prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to multilateral control within the framework of military alliances, for instance, NATO. If such a provision is included in the treaty, we shall have no difficulty in agreeing on the final formulas of the draft we are preparing.

Today I should like to emphasize that in articles I and II of the United States draft there is no mention of several important obligations in respect of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and these omissions make this draft unacceptable.

First, in the United States draft there is no mention of any obligation not to grant non-nuclear States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, disposal and use of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the United States draft fails to include the important provision that a party to the treaty possessing nuclear weapons must not place these weapons or control over them and over their emplacement and use at the disposal of units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or military personnel are under the command of a military alliance.

Thirdly, where the United States draft treaty mentions the obligations of non-nuclear Powers, there is missing the important provision that such States undertake to refrain from receiving nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, directly or indirectly, for their ownership, control or use and that they will not

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

participate in the ownership, control or use of such weapons or in the testing of such weapons.

It should be obvious to all that the lack of the aforementioned provisions in the United States draft leaves precisely those loop-holes of which, as indicated in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), the treaty should be void.

In this respect the comparative assessment of the Soviet and United States draft treaties made today in the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic is noteworthy. Mr. Khallaf said that if we compare article I of the Soviet and United States draft treaties, it turns out that the Soviet text of article I of the treaty is more in keeping with the requirements laid down in the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly: namely, that the non-proliferation treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit access to nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, in any form, by States not possessing such weapons. Unfortunately, the representatives of the Western Powers continue to insist on their inconsistent approach to the solution of this problem and have even perceptibly stiffened their position. Today's statement by the United States representative, Mr. Fisher, has introduced no change into the existing situation.

At the previous stage the Western Powers pretended that they were in favour of a comprehensive treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, without any exceptions. That is why they stressed in the debate that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force does not, in their opinion, involve proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now that they have failed to mislead the world on this score, the Western representatives are putting the stress on something else. They no longer argue about whether or not the participation of a non-nuclear State in a so-called collective nuclear force constitutes proliferation.

Now Lord Chalfont declares that our assessment of the United States draft treaty, namely that the main and most dangerous shortcoming of the United States draft is that it leaves open the possibility of giving non-nuclear States access to nuclear weapons through the NATO military alliance — this assessment of ours, according to Lord Chalfont, can be taken to imply a considerable degree of interference in the legitimate workings of NATO and, indeed, of any alliance that contains nuclear and non-nuclear Powers (ENDC/PV.244, p.11). Lord Chalfont has

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

found a very simple means of getting out of the vicious circle of contradictions in which the position of the Western Powers on this question finds itself. He simply declares that an attempt to extend the treaty to cover non-nuclear States members of the NATO military bloc would be "interference in the legitimate workings of NATO"! Well, as the saying goes, that is about the limit.

All in all, it turns out that NATO must be an inviolable, sacred sanctuary for non-nuclear States seeking access to nuclear weapons, where they can be free from the operation of the treaty. Of course, this is an inconsistent and unacceptable position, which does not stand up to any criticism from the point of view of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the statement he made last Tuesday, 1 March, the United Kingdom representative approached the question from a different angle. He asked, "Is it unreasonable that the collective forces of NATO should include nuclear weapons ...?" (ibid., p.12). Putting the question in this way leaves, as you see, no room for such considerations as whether or not this is consistent with the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this question only one consideration is taken into account: the reasonableness of equipping with nuclear weapons the so-called collective forces of NATO, the principal nucleus of which is the West German Bundeswehr.

Now the United Kingdom representative no longer tries to confuse the issue. He removes from his phraseology the veil of deliberate obscurity, ambiguity and vagueness and states quite frankly that, in his opinion, it should be considered that within the framework of NATO the proliferation of nuclear weapons can take place, not from the moment when access to nuclear weapons is acquired by a State which is not at present a nuclear Power, but only when this State is in a position to give the order to fire nuclear weapons. But, with all due respect to Lord Chalfont, it will then be too late to talk of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In making such statements the United Kingdom representative is trying to turn the question in such a way that our basic objective --- the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons --- should be left in the shade and relegated to the background, the question of NATO collective nuclear forces should be brought to the fore and given priority, and the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be limited

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

to what is left outside the nuclear forces of NATO. This is not the first time that we have been confronted with such attempts on the part of the Western Powers. We first heard this idea from the mouth of Mr. Herter, the United States Secretary of State, in December 1960, at the very end of General Eisenhower's presidency.

And now in the Committee we are told by Lord Chalfont, not of how to ensure an invulnerable treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, without any loopholes, but that the "dignity" of the non-nuclear members of NATO "as free and sovereign States" — in this expression of Lord Chalfont's the same Western Germany is meant — requires their participation in nuclear matters within the framework of NATO.

These appeals by Lord Chalfont to embellish the "dignity" and "sovereignty" of Western Germany with a necklace of nuclear bombs give rise to certain associations of ideas. They bring to mind the 1920's after the First World War and the early 1930's when Germany, invoking the principle of "equal rights" and sovereignty, succeeded in bringing about first rearmament, then the re-militarization of the Rhineland, after which there began a series of territorial annexations and, in the end, the war was unleashed by Hitler's Reich. The road along which the development of events is going today is very reminiscent of the fatal road of the past, and the United States and the United Kingdom, which are favouring this, bear a heavy responsibility.

A new idea has lately appeared in the battery of arguments used by the Western Powers. We are now being told insistently that NATO will fall apart unless the Federal Republic of Germany is given access to nuclear weapons, and consequently that any demand aimed at preventing Western Germany from being given access to nuclear weapons as a member of NATO represents a plot designed to undermine NATO and to bring about its dissolution. The artificiality and far-fetched nature of this — save the mark! — argument is obvious to everyone. It is not difficult to perceive that the Western Powers are using this argument here at the suggestion of the Federal Republic of Germany, under the influence of blackmail and threats from Bonn.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In connexion with this fabrication from Bonn, we can point to the generally-known fact that in NATO itself no one except Western Germany considers that an essential condition for the existence of NATO is the granting of access to nuclear weapons in one form or another to the Federal Republic of Germany within the framework of NATO. Statements to the contrary are made by Western Germany's allies in NATO merely by way of allied support. The artificiality and groundlessness of this newly-invented argument of the Western Powers is perfectly clear to everyone. I need hardly say that we cannot take this argument into consideration at all if all of us are really in earnest about solving the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and are not trying to derive some military advantage for ourselves in this matter and to bring about a preponderance in our favour.

If the Western Powers have a serious attitude towards the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, they will undoubtedly find ways and means of curbing their unduly warlike German ally and bringing its behaviour in this matter into conformity with the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and will not try to obtain an exceptional position for it, as the United States is doing in its draft treaty. In the light of these self-evident considerations, Lord Chalfont's attempt to reduce the substance of the differences to arguments about different interpretations of the concept of military alliances does not stand up to criticism.

I repeat once again that the question of access to nuclear weapons in any way by Western Germany within the framework of negotiations concerning a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a question of concepts of military alliances or of their policy or strategy. Only those who are not interested in solving the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, or those who are tools in the hands of such people, can give that kind of twist to the question. The attempt to turn the discussion in that direction reflects the desire to confuse the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to evade its solution.

Another argument advanced in favour of the United States approach to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is that the United States draft limits access to nuclear weapons. We are told that, under the United States draft treaty, not all non-nuclear States will be given access to nuclear weapons in the form of collective participation in their control, but only those

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

non-nuclear States which are allies of the United States in the NATO military bloc. This is an example of plain nepotism on the part of the United States. What is odd, however, is that the United States should assume that such a specific, family approach could be taken as a basis for agreement.

Do not cherish any illusions! Such an approach is not acceptable to the Soviet Union or to any of the socialist countries, or to the non-aligned countries, which have clearly stated in the Committee, through the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi (ENDC/PV.240, p.16), that they are against any attempts to establish a kind of third category of States -- that is to say, to create, in addition to the existing nuclear and non-nuclear countries, a category of States having access to nuclear weapons on the basis of participation in a military alliance. But that is precisely the aim which the United States draft treaty pursues. Moreover, this was frankly stated by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, on 31 August 1965. He declared that "The treaty would not, however, preclude the establishment of nuclear arrangements -- such as a multilateral force within NATO -- ..." (ENDC/PV.228, p.38)

In the course of the previous discussion we pointed out that a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must close the door of access to these weapons to all non-nuclear States, whether through their acquisition by non-nuclear countries for the purpose of having them in their ownership, at their disposal or under their control, or through obtaining access to these weapons of mass destruction by indirect means, through the participation of non-nuclear countries in collective ownership or control of nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO. On several occasions we have drawn attention to this aspect of the question: namely, that the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, like any coin, has two sides. On one side we have national possession or control of nuclear weapons, and on the other side indirect access to them by non-nuclear countries through their participation either in the NATO multilateral nuclear force, or in the NATO Atlantic nuclear force, or any other similar organization concerned with questions of the use and application of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Both these aspects of access to nuclear weapons are two forms of one and the same process, extremely dangerous to the cause of peace: the process of proliferation of nuclear weapons, a process which must be stopped in both its forms by a treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both these ways, both these channels for proliferation of atomic weapons must be closed. No exceptions to this can be tolerated if we want the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to have any value, or, to be more accurate, if we want such a treaty to come into being.

In connexion with the aforesaid position of the United States delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on this question, I think that it would be of interest to the members of the Committee to acquaint themselves with the statements which were made on this subject by Senator Joseph Clark on 18 January this year during the discussion of Senator Pastore's resolution on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is what Senator Clark said:

"Mr. President, with regard to the comment of the Secretary of State to the effect that a supposed conflict between nuclear arrangements in the NATO alliance and a non-proliferation treaty is not a real one, suffice it to say that reasonable men may differ. I differ, and many other Americans differ with the Secretary of State in this regard. It is a matter of record that the Russians have repeatedly asserted their willingness to sign a non-proliferation treaty which would prohibit the creation of a NATO nuclear force".

Then Senator Clark went on to say:

"Mr. President ... I do not believe it advances the argument very much to deny that the proposed nuclear force is an obstacle to the treaty, when the Russians have said over and over again that, so far as they are concerned, it is not only an obstacle, but that it would make the treaty impossible.

"It is an open secret" -- Senator Clark continued -- "that the U.S. draft treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons was purposely written with a gaping loop-hole in it to permit the creation of a new NATO nuclear

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

force of some sort. Time and again the Russians have declared their objection to this provision on the ground that it would permit the West Germans to get their fingers on the nuclear trigger — and well it might". Senator Clark concluded his statement with the following words:

"... What we must do now, if we are really serious about getting a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, is ... to rewrite the treaty ... to close the loop-hole created for the proposed NATO nuclear force". (Congressional Record, Vol. 112, No. 6, 18 January 1966,
pp. 480-481)

That is the course which the United States delegation should follow, so that this important problem can be settled here without any further delay.

In our statement today we have shown the inconsistency of the position of the Western Powers and have laid bare the shortcomings of the United States draft treaty which make it unacceptable. That draft cannot serve as the basis for an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the Committee has before it the Soviet draft treaty, which does not suffer from those shortcomings. One can argue about one or other of its specific provisions; one can improve and develop them; but no one can prove that this draft leaves the slightest chink or loop-hole for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly. Therefore we propose that this document be taken as the basis for drafting the agreement.

The Soviet delegation would like to stress that we are prepared to consider any amendments or additions to our draft treaty and to show the utmost flexibility and a constructive spirit in this regard. At the same time, however, one condition must be observed: namely, that it is essential in the interests of our common cause that amendments and additions, if any, should be directed towards the sole purpose of preparing a treaty on non-proliferation which would close all loop-holes for proliferation of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the requirements of resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly. Any amendments and additions which would sidetrack us from this objective, or, a fortiori, any which would run counter to it, would undoubtedly only hamper our work.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

At the same time, we should have no objection to the Committee continuing to compare the two draft treaties submitted by the delegations of the Soviet Union and of the United States, with a view to determining which of them answers better to the purpose set before us. In the course of such an objective comparison, any unprejudiced participant in the discussion will certainly see that the Soviet draft treaty fully, consistently and in every way covers the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but the United States draft treaty does not. We believe, however, that this aspect of the question is already clear to everyone.

It seems to us that, in the light of the discussion that has taken place, the choice to be made is clear. We must set about the final drafting of the text of an agreement on the basis of the Soviet draft. We think that, when the Committee resumes its discussion of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in about two weeks' time, all the representatives should have the necessary instructions from their Governments so that all the members of the Committee can deal with the drafting of the articles of the treaty in real earnest.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): First of all, I should like to congratulate the Soviet delegation on the further great success which Soviet scientists and the whole Soviet people have achieved in the conquest of outer space through the successful flight of two space vehicles to Venus. After the soft landing of a space craft on the moon, this new scientific achievement of the USSR is a further step towards the conquest of the universe. On behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation I welcome to our midst the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and the new leader of the United States delegation, Mr. Fisher.

The Czechoslovak delegation deems it necessary to make at least a few brief comments on the statements made by certain delegations at previous meetings, when they referred in their arguments to the statement made by the Czechoslovak delegation at the 242nd meeting. I have in mind the statement made by the representative of Italy (ENDC/PV.243, p.25) and that made by the representative of the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.244, pp. 10, 11).

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

I wish to stress in advance that the Czechoslovak delegation does not intend to delay our negotiations by instigating a sterile controversy. But in this case a serious question is involved which has a bearing on the very approach of the aforementioned delegations to the discussion of so serious a problem as that of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We consider that the approach of those delegations, in particular that of the United Kingdom delegation, and the way in which they try to depict the position of the Czechoslovak delegation and to adapt it to the needs of their arguments aimed at justifying the attempts to bring about an indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO, are not in keeping with the meaning and importance of the question of non-proliferation.

Therefore we deem it necessary to repeat once again our point of view on this question which we expressed in our statement at the 242nd meeting. On 1 March the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, quoted the following part of the statement I made on 22 February:

"First, there can be no doubt that a non-proliferation treaty is not aimed at the dissolution of existing military alliances. Nor is its purpose to interfere in the activity or internal affairs of these alliances." (ibid., p. 10).

The representative of the United Kingdom further declared:

"My delegation welcomes that statement. But the representative of the Soviet Union said on 17 February: 'The main shortcoming of the United States draft treaty, and a very dangerous one, is that it leaves open the possibility of non-nuclear States participating in nuclear weapons through the NATO military alliance'." (ibid., p.11)

Lord Chalfont went on to say:

"That statement could be read to imply a considerable degree of interference in the legitimate workings of NATO, and indeed of any alliance that contains nuclear and non-nuclear Powers." (ibid.)

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

It is obvious that the purpose of this statement of the representative of the United Kingdom is, on the one hand, to foster the utterly unjustified impression that the Czechoslovak delegation considers that a non-proliferation treaty must in no case affect the activity of military alliances, and that the delegations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries uphold a different point of view and are trying to use a non-proliferation treaty for unjustified and inadmissible interference in the internal activities of NATO. All this is a distortion of the position of the Czechoslovak delegation in regard to the relation of a non-proliferation treaty to such activities of military groupings as would result in the spread of nuclear weapons in any form. It is also a distortion of the position of the delegations of the other socialist States in regard to the purpose of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Czechoslovak delegation does not intend to explain the point of view of other socialist delegations. But we deem it necessary to reply to the aforementioned attempt to distort our position, which was expressed in the statement we made on 22 February. For this reason we are obliged to quote once again the relevant part of that statement. This is what I said:

"First, there can be no doubt that a non-proliferation treaty is not aimed at the dissolution of existing military alliances. Nor is its purpose to interfere in the activity or internal affairs of these alliances. However, this premise, of course, remains valid only as long as their activity does not affect the field of proliferation of nuclear weapons. As soon as any actions within the framework of military groupings led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form, they would naturally become incompatible with a treaty on measures to prevent proliferation.

"It is precisely this danger that is inherent in the plan for the integration of nuclear armament, various versions of which have for long been a subject of discussion among some of the States members of NATO." (ENDC/PV.242, pp.31, '32)

That is the complete quotation, which, as you see, was not given in full.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

In order that our position on this question may be clear to everyone and also in order that the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, may not be left in doubt and uncertainty, I think it appropriate to quote also that passage in the statement we made at the 242nd meeting, which immediately preceded the words which he quoted at the 244th meeting. In that part of its statement the Czechoslovak delegation said:

"The United States draft shows once again that the Western Powers are trying to adapt and to subordinate measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons to certain concepts in the field of nuclear armaments, to concepts which certain circles in some of the States members of NATO have been discussing and juggling with for a long time.

"A number of facts which the delegations of the socialist countries have already pointed out show that the gist and true meaning of these plans is the indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons as a means by which some non-nuclear Powers -- in particular the Federal Republic of Germany -- would be given access in one form or another to nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO. These States would thus be afforded the possibility of participating in the control of nuclear weapons and in taking decisions concerning these weapons which are at present under the control of the nuclear Powers members of NATO, and in particular the United States and the United Kingdom." (ibid., p.31)

That is the point of view of the Czechoslovak delegation, and that is how it was expressed at the 242nd meeting. We consider that it does not leave any room for ambiguity and we are convinced that it is quite clear to the representative of the United Kingdom as well.

In conclusion, I should like to add a few more words. The position adopted by the delegations of the States members of NATO in our negotiations proves once again that our point of view is altogether justified and right. This is also shown, in our opinion, by the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom at our last meeting. A considerable part of his statement was devoted once again to justifying the attempts to limit the non-proliferation treaty so as not to cover actions that would lead to the indirect spread of nuclear weapons within the framework of Western military alliances, particularly within the framework

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

of NATO at the present time. This problem is becoming a really serious — and I stress the word serious — obstacle in the way of the achievement of agreement by our Committee on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is not only the delegations of the socialist countries that hold this point of view. The representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, also drew attention to this fact in her statement on 24 February when she said that the most controversial issue at present, that of the multilateral nuclear force or the Atlantic nuclear force or nuclear sharing within NATO, must be agreed upon by the nuclear super-Powers; until then it acted as an obstacle to truly responsible negotiations (ENDC/PV.243, p. 9).

Lord Chalfont tried to justify his point of view by referring to the "concept of sharing" (ENDC/PV.244, p.12), on which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is said to be based. The Czechoslovak delegation, of course, has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of NATO or of causing discord among its members. But we cannot escape the impression that this concept of "sharing", on which the representative of the United Kingdom built his argument, is far from being accepted and supported by all the States members of NATO. This is also evident from a recent statement made by a prominent statesman of one of the major States members of NATO at a press conference given by him. Further evidence of this is the extremely reserved attitude of some other members of NATO towards the "sharing" by non-nuclear NATO Powers in nuclear armament, the purpose of which consists mainly in satisfying the ever-increasing claims of the Federal Republic of Germany in this field.

According to the words of the representative of the United Kingdom on 1 March, the concept of "sharing" within the framework of NATO relates to the "sharing" of costs, of responsibilities, of weapons and of forces (ENDC/PV.244, p.12). In regard to such "sharing" in the field of weapons, the delegations of the States members of NATO in our Committee frankly declare that it should also cover the participation of non-nuclear NATO States in the sharing of the nuclear weapons which the NATO nuclear States have at their disposal.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

In this connexion the representative of the United Kingdom asked whether it was unreasonable that the collective forces of NATO should include nuclear weapons (ibid.). As can be gathered from the whole discussion on this question, these collective forces would comprise the armed forces of the nuclear and non-nuclear States members of NATO. From the whole of his argument it follows that he would consider the equipping of these forces with nuclear weapons to be perfectly right. Thus from Lord Chalfont's statement the conclusion can be drawn that this "sharing" in nuclear armament within the framework of NATO would consist in the fact that some non-nuclear NATO States would share in the costs connected with nuclear weapons, and in the responsibility for nuclear weapons (that is, in particular, in the control over them and in decisions concerning their use); further, that they would share in the disposal of the nuclear weapons themselves; and lastly, that this participation would consist in the armed forces of the NATO non-nuclear States being included in collective forces equipped with nuclear weapons.

In the light of these facts it becomes clear why the delegations of the NATO countries stress so much that the ban on the spread of nuclear weapons should concern only their acquisition or transfer to "independent national control". It is obvious why they try so stubbornly to prove that a non-proliferation treaty should not affect nuclear weapons within the framework of military alliances and that non-nuclear States within the framework of these groupings should be in a different, privileged position vis-à-vis the non-aligned non-nuclear States. It is also obvious why those States which are really interested in the adoption of consistent measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, direct or indirect, cannot agree with such a concept of non-proliferation.

The CHAIRMAN (India): As representative of India, I should like to thank the representatives of Burma, Mexico, Ethiopia and Sweden, who with their personal and national affection and good will for India have expressed their condolences on the losses we have suffered in the untimely death of our late Prime Minister, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, and the late Chairman of our Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Homi Bhabha.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 245th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H. E. Ambassador V. C. Trivedi, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 8 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.